that the military should play a greater role in homeland security. They argue that the military should be prepared to fight the nation's wars and should also provide a force to assist in the consequence management from a successful WMD attack. There are many issues to this debate that must be examined ranging from funding, training, equipping, size of the force, and the ability to move to the incident site quickly and with the capabilities to save the lives of those affected by the attack. This paper will focus on determining the correct size and defining the capabilities that this force should have to allow it to move quickly enough to the incident site to conduct our primary mission, saving lives. If we fail to plan and execute this mission properly, we would fail the American people and it would have grave implications for the homeland.
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE HOMELAND, WHAT DOES RIGHT LOOK LIKE?
Chemical, Biological, radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield explosive (CBRNE) incidents will pose a great challenge to the security of the American people for the foreseeable future. A terrorist attack on U.S. soil, an accidental CBRNE incident, or one caused by a natural disaster could create catastrophic conditions likely to overwhelm response capabilities of civil authorities and we the military must be prepared to respond.
-General Victor E. Renuart, Commander, USNORTHERN COMMAND The Attack
On September 11, 2001 , a group of Islamic terrorists executed a series of coordinated suicide attacks against the homeland of the United States. This was the first foreign-borne, 1 major attack 2 Prior to this attack, no specific agency or department within the federal government was charged with the security of the homeland. The primary agency for collection of foreign intelligence was the CIA and the primary agency for conducting domestic investigations was the FBI. The 9-11 Commission report found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) "did not have the capability to link the collection knowledge gained by the agents in the field to national priorities." Domestic agencies deferred this requirement to the FBI believing it to be their responsibility.
against the homeland since the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The tragic events of 9-11 proved that the United States Government was not prepared to combat this type of direct, transnational threat. The federal government would have to transform or create new organizations to meet the challenges and secure America from another such horrific attack. 3 The Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) also shared in the blame from the 9-11 report. The report suggested that the CIA needed to greatly "improve its ability to collect intelligence from human agents." 4 Although the FBI and CIA both needed similar information, they found it extremely difficult to share information. "The US government did not have a way of pooling intelligence and using it to guide the planning and assignment of responsibilities for joint operations involving entities like the CIA, the FBI, the Department of State, the military and other agencies involved in homeland security." 5 DOD was also found to have problems with intelligence sharing. 6 The 9-11
Report found that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had "limited authority over the direction of the intelligence community, including agencies within the Department of
Defense." 7 DOD had other problems identified in the 9-11 report also. The report stated that "at no point before 9-11 was the Department of Defense fully engaged in the mission of countering al Qaeda, even though this was perhaps the most dangerous foreign enemy threatening the United States." 8 DOD was commended in the report for establishing NORTHCOM as the command charged with defending the homeland but NORAD was cited for their inability to protect the nation's air space and were cited as "unprepared for the attacks launched against them."
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The events of 9-11 forced the Federal Government and DOD to act quickly and implement major organizational changes. The Federal Government created the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOD created United States Northern
Command (NORTHCOM). Now that the whole of government had reacted to form these new organizations, they would have to determine how they would execute their assigned missions. DHS was charged with the overall mission of securing the homeland but NORTHCOM was charged with the mission of defending the homeland. 10 Not only would NORTHCOM be required to determine how to best defend the homeland but they were also tasked to execute support to civil authorities in the event of a disaster, naturally occurring or man-made within the continental United States, Alaska and territorial waters. 11 Inherent in the mission was providing forces that had the ability to react with sufficient speed and capability to meet the requirements of civil leaders. If this event were another terrorist attack like the attack on September 11 th The Threat , the attack could range from the bombing of a building to catastrophic, nuclear attack against a major city within the United States.
As far back as 1998, the National Security Strategy stated, "Due to our military superiority, potential enemies, whether nations or terrorist groups, may be more likely in the future to resort to terrorist acts or other attacks against vulnerable civilian targets in the United States instead of conventional military operations."
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Biological and chemical weapons are recognized by many experts as the most dangerous and easiest to develop. There is a great deal of "how to" information available on the internet to teach any would-be terrorist how to attack desired targets and terrorist events over the last few years show this to be the case. Internet sites give step-by-step instruction and show would-be terrorists how to produce the agents. It even suggests mechanisms for delivery of the weapon for the greatest possible effect.
These attacks could be in the form of conventional terrorist attacks like the Oklahoma City bombing or in the form of a WMD attack like the attack in the Japanese subway. Numerous documents over the last 20 years have stated that the greatest threat to our national security is the employment of WMD on the United States soil by a non-state actor. 13 Nuclear weapons, although much more dangerous, are harder to develop and employ. With the proliferation of nuclear material around the world in recent years, the demise of the Soviet Union and inadequate nuclear control in countries like Pakistan, the possibility of some of the nuclear material finding its way into the hands of a terrorist group is increasing every day.
14 Two even more likely attack scenarios are the terrorist's use of a toxic industrial agent such as chlorine, as seen in Iraq, or a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) deployed in a major city.
The catastrophic results of this type of attack make it one of the major concerns of the federal government. 15 Both of these scenarios are real, dangerous and relatively easy for a terrorist to execute. 24 The purpose of these scenarios was to represent the greatest dangers facing the United States in order to identify the spectrum of tasks and capabilities needed to prepare for and respond to many different hazards. 25 The 15
National Planning Scenarios provide parameters regarding the nature, scale and complexity of significant incidents for the nation. 26 They include events ranging from a terrorist WMD attack to natural disasters and represent a range of potential incidents, rather than every possible threat or hazard. The scenarios provide the basis to define prevention, protection, response and recovery tasks that must be performed, as well as the capabilities required to perform them. 27 As the interagency lead planners began planning against these scenarios, they determined that they could not plan for all scenarios simultaneously. They decided to prioritize the fifteen scenarios and begin planning for the worst scenario first, scenario 1:
Nuclear Detonation, 10 kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). 28 FEMA was designated as the lead for the DHS planning effort. This resulted in the interagency planning team focusing primarily on the response and recovery aspects of the mission.
This was due to FEMA's longstanding mission of emergency response and recovery in the event of natural disasters.
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As the planning proceeded, the number of projected casualties in the 10KT nuclear event immediately overwhelmed the capabilities of the state and local officials and it became obvious that the federal government would have to assist. It quickly became apparent to DOD that they would have to develop capabilities to serve as part of the federal response. Not only would the actual WMD event create unimaginable problems for the country, the clean-up of most of these events would be a huge undertaking for the federal government. This is why the federal government expended an extraordinary amount of effort and funding aimed at preventing or mitigating such an event. The federal government was worst casing the possible attack scenarios and planning for extensive restoration efforts if we should fail to prevent the attack.
United States Army Northern Command
While the federal government was evolving with the creation of DHS, DOD was not far behind. DOD acted quickly to increase its emphasis on defending the homeland by creating NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM was activated at Peterson Air Force Base on October 1, 2002. NORTHCOM assumed the mission of homeland defense, but it was also tasked to conduct civil support operations in the homeland. NORTHCOM was "specifically to conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the command's assigned area of responsibility; and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations."
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In our nation's history, it was the National Guard that had always served as the organization charged with providing a force to secure and defend the homeland but now NORTHCOM was the Combatant Command charged with defending North America.
NORTHCOM was also given the mission of consequence management as was the requirement to provide assistance and support to civil authorities in managing the consequences from natural and manmade disasters such as forest fires, hurricanes and the 9-11 attack. 31 Due to the increased threat of another terrorist attack in the homeland using convention explosives or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the President and Congress pushed DOD to ensure the homeland was properly defended. Many of these same senior leaders believed that the military should also provide a force to assist civil authorities with the clean-up or consequence management of the aftermath of a catastrophic, WMD attack. These leaders believed that DOD had more than enough
forces not committed to current operations that they should be able to provide a substantial rapid reaction force to respond to any location in the United States and assist with the aftermath of such an attack. Based on this requirement, the Secretary of Defense direct DOD to establish a CBRNE Consequence Management force. Naval Academy in May 1998 announced that "the nation would do more to protect its citizens against the growing threat of chemical and biological terrorism." 33 As part of this effort, he said, the Department of Defense would form ten teams to support state and local authorities in the event of an incident involving weapons of mass destruction.
The WMD Civil Support Teams, formed from National Guard forces, were established to rapidly deploy to an incident site and assist in determining the nature and extent of an attack or incident. They were to provide expert technical advice on WMD response operations and help identify and support the arrival of follow-on state and federal military response forces. 34 The ten initial teams were established and fielded in the ten FEMA regions as a part of the Federal approach to reacting to a catastrophic event.
Due to the success of the WMD-CSTs, DOD asked for and congress approved an additional 47 CSTs bringing the total to 57 teams. 35 After further analysis, DOD and the federal government decided that they needed more than just the assessment of the CSTs at the incident site. They needed additional assistance for local authorities with greater command and control, an increased search and extraction capability, greater CBRN detection and decontamination, and a capability for medical treatment. DOD in conjunction with the National Guard then established the CBRNE Enhanced Response
Force Package (CERF-P) and fielded 17 CERF-Ps aligned with the ten FEMA regions. 36 NORTHCOM Planning DOD believed that between these two capabilities, it had provided a significant force to assist the state and local authorities but struggled with the possible need for a larger, more robust federal force to support the federal response if the state and local officials were overwhelmed.
NORTHCOM began a parallel planning effort while at the same time participating in the DHS interagency planning efforts for their AOR. In constructing AOR specific plans, NORTHCOM identified several issues to solve or overcome to successfully execute their consequence management plan. Several of these problems were:
defining the threat and mission for DOD, determine the unit size and composition (active duty, reserve, National Guard or a mixture of all three components), capabilities of the force, the concept of employment, the DOD mission priority, Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) associated problems 37 , and finally equipment, training and money for the mission.
Several of these problems, the mission priority, troop mixture, equipment, training and money, fall outside the scope of this paper and will not be addressed.
NORTHCOM's first priority was to determine the mission. Once NORTHCOM knew the mission, they would then move onto the unit capabilities which would then drive the size of the force needed. The final piece for the planners would be to determine the concept for the employment. As NORTHCOM began planning the new mission, their planners first needed guidance on the number of events to plan against. Response Forces (CCMRFs) to react to three to six nearly simultaneous, catastrophic events.
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After receiving Secretary McHale's guidance, NORTHCOM began mission analysis and determined that there were two parts to this newly assigned mission.
There was a "prevent/search" portion of the mission and also the "response or consequence management" portion. The prevent task is an absolutely essential piece of the NORTHCOM mission but falls outside the scope of this paper which will concentrate only on the consequence management portion of the DOD mission.
The CCMRF During mission analysis, NORTHCOM determined that there would be a requirement several thousand Soldiers per CCMRF and would require a minimum of one CCMRF per event. The planners also determined the capabilities that needed to be resident in the force would be extensive. They would need a CBRN assessment and decontamination capability and a very extensive medical treatment capability. The force would need a large command and control (C2) section with an extensive communications capability to control the forces in the event area. The CCMRF would also need to have a large sustainment capability and it would also need to provide force protection around the incident site. With the type of catastrophic event that NORTHCOM was planning against, the reaction force would also require an extensive transportation capability, both ground and air.
The CCMRF forces would provide first responder type support (medical, search and rescue) at such an event in an attempt to save the lives of the victims as depicted in Attempting to solve the complex problem of consequence management in the homeland, the Department of Defense has made excellent strides and is moving in the correct direction. The decision to establish NORTHCOM as a Geographic Combatant
Command was appropriate and solved the question of which combatant commander was charged with the defense of the homeland. Defense of the homeland was and remains DOD's number one priority. DOD's decision to establish the CSTs and CERFPs may not have solved the problem of preventing a WMD attack but it was a great initial step forward in assessing and starting the recovery from a WMD attack.
The next major step was to establish a larger force that would provide the next level of assistance, the federal response, to assist the local, state, and regional forces in the event of a catastrophic attack. NORTHCOM's solution was 4,500 man Brigade Combat Team (BCT) size force, the CCMRF. The CCMRF was a great force with tremendous capabilities but the problem with CCMRF was that along with its great capability comes great size and large numbers of personnel to man the force. The size of the organization makes it cumbersome and very slow to move and react. To fill the capabilities required in the CCMRF, the force providers were also required to look across the entire homeland.
The organizational structure set for the first CCMRF came from all the services and across numerous states. The units that comprise the CCMRFs are so geographically dispersed that it would take several days to move the assessment and life saving forces to the site. As stated earlier, based on the size of a single CCMRF, it would take several more days to move the remainder of the force to the incident site.
NORTHCOM had established a force that was extremely capable but could not move to the incident site quickly enough to execute the mission of saving the lives of the victims.
They would also arrive too slowly to assist with the medical treatment of the victims or be able to assist with the search and rescue mission. All the speed in the world with no capability does nothing for the people in need at the site but conversely, having a great capability that cannot get to the site quickly enough to make a difference means nothing to the casualties either. capabilities, the RRF would also be capable of establishing the initial operational control structure for all DOD forces on the ground at the incident cite.
Although the RRF is an excellent bridge capability and possible solution to the problem, the CCMRFs or a portion of it must still be factored into the final solution. To determine the best solution, one must consider several criteria. The criteria that should be used to evaluate the possible solutions sets would be total number of personnel, speed to the incident site, technical capabilities for a single incident, operational capabilities for a single site and lastly, capabilities to operate at three separate incident sites simultaneously with the required technical and operational capabilities.
Standing the Test of Evaluation
The first criterion used to evaluate possible solutions would be the total number of personnel within the CCMRF organization. The total number of personnel in each current CCMRF construct is approximately 4500-5000 42 . Since the stated requirement is to be able to react to three nearly, simultaneous catastrophic event, this would make the total number of personnel for utilization in a possible solution for all three CCMRFs at a maximum of approximately 15,000 personnel. So the total number of personnel required for all three CCMRFs cannot exceed 15,000 and this would therefore be the screening criteria for all considered COAs.
The second criteria to evaluate COAs would be the ability of the force to arrive rapidly enough to save the lives of the victims at the incident site. Normally, the expectation is that life saving organizations arrive at an attack site as quickly as possible. The CSTs are set to deploy within the first three hours 43 to provide an initial assessment of the suspected or actual WMD attack. The CST advanced party is required to deploy within 1.5 hours of notification. The CERF-P is required to deploy within six hours 44 The third and a fourth criterion used to evaluate the proposed force would be the overall "capabilities" of the force. The capability criteria would be divided into two subsets: technical capabilities and operational capabilities. The third criteria, technical capabilities, would be those capabilities associated with the initial assessment of an incident site and saving the lives of the victims at the site through search and extraction and medical treatment. This would also include assessment capabilities as these capabilities relate to characterizing the site for contamination from chemical agents, biological agents, toxic industrial chemicals (TICs), toxic industrial materials (TIMs) or radiological contamination associated with a radiological dispersion device (RDD) or of notification to provide more robust support to the CST and first responders. The next DOD capability must be capable of deploying within the first 12-24 hours after an attack. In addition to arriving at the scene quickly, the CCMRF must bring the right capabilities: life saving, medical treatment, command and control, etc., to save lives and assist in the actual conduct of operations at the incident site.
improvised nuclear device (IND). Decontamination capabilities would also be included in this requirement due to the need to decontaminate victims of a WMD attack.
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Operational capabilities, the fourth criteria, would be the capabilities associated with command and control, sustainment, transportation and force protection due to the requirement for the force to provide support and assistance for 30 days or more.
Therefore, the force must have a sufficient sustainment capability to accomplish this mission. The transportation capability would need to have both air and ground capabilities due to the need for both emergency and normal resupply missions around the incident area and possible medical evacuation of casualties by air and ground. In and around a catastrophic incident site, civil unrest and violence will be prevalent so force protection would be another vitally important operational capability. When evaluating COA1 against response requirements for three sites, it is evident that the three CCMRFs would be able to accomplish the consequence management mission except for saving victims lives. This COA also provides great technical and operational capabilities at one, two or three separate incident sites. The only problem with COA 1 is that, as explained throughout this a paper, it does not arrive at the incident site quickly enough to actually assist in saving the lives of the victims that were attacked.
"the ability to conduct operations at three separate sites simultaneously." The second requirement is the self imposed cap of 15,000 personnel committed to this mission for the homeland. The total force is not allowed to exceed this maximum. 49 Based on the NORTHCOM construct of approximately 4,500 50 personnel per CCMRF, COA 1 also meets our screening criteria of having no more than 15,000 personnel for the overall organization. COA 1 is a viable alternative but would not be the preferred solution.
COA 2's organization also maintains the ability to initially command and control or operate three incident sites with multiple RRFs although at a much reduced level when comparing the RRFs (battalion size organization) with three CCMRFs (brigade size organization). This COA also meets the personnel screening requirement of 15,000 or less personnel. The ten RRF COA provides excellent technical capabilities at all three incident sites and it arrives very quickly due to its regional orientation. The RRF option lacks many of the other operational capabilities like air and ground transportation and force protection that the CCMRFs would provide. COA 2's major shortage is the RRFs inability to operate the site for a prolonged or sustained period of time. COA 2 meets all requirements and has the ability to conduct operational control around one, two or three sites for a short period of time. This COA lacks the ability and is not designed to operationally control one site much less three separate sites for a prolonged duration of 30 days or longer.
When considering COA 3, it contains three CCMRFs so it definitely retains the capability to simultaneously operate three geographically separate incident sites. In analyzing this COA against our second criteria or the screening criteria of 15,000 personnel, it is obvious that it would not meet this limiting factor. The three CCMRFs have approximately 15,000 personnel and when the 5,000 personnel from the ten RRFs are added into the total personnel numbers, this COA would require approximately 20,000 personnel. COA 3 provides ten RRFs in addition to the CCMRFs so it would provide excellent technical and operational capabilities to all three incident sites.
Finally, in terms of speed, with the ten RRFs, this COA would arrive at the scene very quickly. This COA would provide the best capability of all but due to the fact that it requires more personnel than allowed, it is excluded from further consideration.
COAs 4, 5, and 6 are all similar. They each have ten RRFs assigned but have different numbers of CCMRFs (-). COA 4 would have ten RRFs and three CCMRFs (-).
Since this COA has three modified CCMRF (-) organizations contained its structure, it definitely has the ability to conduct operations at three separate sites. Once again, a majority of the assessment, life saving, search and rescue, decontamination and medical capabilities would be removed from the CCMRF and put into the RRFs. Also, A graphic depiction of the COA comparison is seen in Table 1 . The requirements to arrive quickly enough to save lives and reduce suffering (Speed) and the ability to operative three separate sites (3 Sites) at the same time are of greater importance than the other three criteria. They will therefore be given an extra weight of (2). The number of personnel (15,000) will be the screening criteria for the decision matrix. If a COA exceeds the maximum number of 15,000, it will be excluded. The remaining criteria, technical and operational capabilities, will carry equal weighting in the decision matrix.
Within the matrix, each COA will be rank ordered from one to six with one being the best and six being the worst rating. Based on the results listed in With the selection of COA 4 which includes the recommendation for a regional response (RRF) supported by the larger CCMRF (-) for sustained operations, it follows that the forces positioned to best fulfill the RRF requirement or take on this mission would probably be the National Guard. This is due to the fact that National Guard between the federal and state and local authorities. This QRD has essentially adopted the recommendations of this paper even before it was published. 54 " In a few short years the leaders across the federal government, through their persistence and vision, have moved the United States much closer to preventing and being able to successfully recover from a WMD terrorist attack in the homeland if it were to happen.
Endnotes
The bomb was designed to detonate under the North Tower and designed to knock the North Tower into the South Tower. Had the attack been successfully executed, this would have been a major foreign borne attack and it would have killed thousands of people. This attack was not successful and only killed six people and injured over 1000.
